Abstract
Introduction
The real estate market distinguishes itself from the financial market in its high degree of illiquidity. Unlike traders in the financial market who can readily buy or sell a security at its equilibrium price, both the buyer and seller in the real estate market must spend time and exert search effort in order to find a suitable counter party and complete the transaction, largely due to the heterogeneity of different properties. In addition, the outcome of an attempted transaction is often uncertain despite the traders' good faith and/or the seller's best marketing effort. In some circumstances the resulting probability of trade may be less than one leaving the property unsold eventually even though ex post gains from trade exist. The question of what determines real estate liquidity has been researched extensively in the literature. Genesove and Han (2012) enumerate the extant studies on the determinants of real estate liquidity, among them: idiosyncrasy of the property (Haurin, 1988) , seller motivations (Glower et al, 1998) , initial offer price (Anglin et al, 2003) , owner equity (Genesove and Mayer, 1997) , previous purchase price (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) , initial list price (Anglin et al, 2003) , and brokers (Levitt and Syverson, 2005; Hendel et al, 2009; and Bernheim and Meer, 2008) . 1 This line of work highlights the multifaceted nature of the liquidity issue, and has prompted researchers to look further into the problem for other factors that may affect real estate liquidity.
In this paper we investigate the role of market volatility in the determination of real estate liquidity. The real estate market, being prone to the influence of various policy shocks and other economic forces, is inherently volatile. 2 There is some empirical evidence which suggests that when the market is volatile and agents become increasingly uncertain about the future trend of certain economic variables relevant to their decision making, market activities might be depressed or even halted. In their report on the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, J.P. Morgan (1998) states that "the lack of property transactions [in the real estate market] reflects investor uncertainty" (Jones and Manuelli, 2002) . In a similar vein, Jones and Manuelli (2001) quote Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995) Implicit in the above account is the recognition that the customer might have superior information about the next day's price movement which the shopkeeper does not have.
As a result the shopkeeper becomes wary of the customer's motive for trade and refuses to trade with her -a typical adverse selection problem. In situations like this, volatile market conditions coupled with agents' information asymmetry regarding certain economic variables of the environment may thus produce a negative impact on the market activity.
The real estate market, by its very nature, is one plagued by asymmetric information. The notion of information asymmetry finds its place in much of the research on real estate transactions. For example, in De Wit and Van der Klaauw (2010) , the seller has private information about certain attributes of his house and/or his own characteristics (e.g., risk preference, financial constraints, and degree of patience). Taylor (1999) models a situation of two-sided asymmetric information in which the seller privately observes the quality of his house while the buyer's taste for the house is known only to the buyer herself. In two influential papers, Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2005, 2007) find that real estate agents on average receive a higher sale price on their own houses than on similar houses owned by their clients, which the authors interpret as evidence for the existence of asymmetric information between the house seller and his agent. These different forms of asymmetric information in the real estate market, whether seller-sided, buyer-sided, or in a seller-agent relationship, conforms well to one's intuition about the market: The seller inherently knows more about his own house and/or about himself than the buyer does, the buyer's tastes for and private valuation of the house are typically unobservable to the seller, and the real estate agent by virtue of her specialized knowledge and expertise possesses better information than her client when it comes to setting ask price and negotiating with the buyer.
The current paper examines the effect of market volatility on the liquidity of real 4 estate properties in the presence of asymmetric information. We start with the benchmark case of symmetric information where the buyer and the seller are either both informed or both uninformed about the fundamental value of the property for sale. We find that market volatility is "neutral" with respect to its effect on property liquidity: the probability of sale is always one regardless of the degree of market volatility. We then consider the case of an informed buyer trading with an uninformed seller. In this situation common value learning takes place on the part of the seller over the entire marketing period, and the seller's optimal search strategy is characterized by a monotonically decreasing sequence of offer prices to a set of potential buyers. We explicitly derive the optimal price sequence whereby an inverse relationship is established between the market volatility and the liquidity of the property. To get a complete picture of the volatility-liquidity relationship the complementary case of an uninformed buyer trading with an informed seller is also examined. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the trading game where the seller signals his private information about the property's fundamental value to the buyer through his offer price. A plausible equilibrium selection criterion allows us to narrow down the set of PBEs of the signaling game. In the equilibrium that maximizes the seller's expected payoff, which at the same time also maximizes the probability of trade, the liquidity of the property is shown to be negatively correlated with the market volatility.
Our paper is most closely related to the work by Krainer (2001) Krainer (2001) and our paper is the measure of liquidity used in the analysis. Instead of the time-on-market (TOM), a commonly used measure of liquidity in most other studies, both of our papers invoke the probability of trade as an alternative measure of liquidity as the latter is better suited to the particular analytic framework adopted in the two papers. As Krainer (2001) argues, "[t] he equilibrium liquidity is synonymous with the equilibrium probability of sale. Thus, the most obvious measure of liquidity is the probability-of-sale function..."
Our paper is also related to the classic work of Haurin (1988) . In contrast to the common-value setting considered in our paper, Haurin (1988) studies the marketing problem of a seller in a private-value setting where the potential buyers' private valuation of the "atypical" attributes of the property is unknown to the seller.
Adopting an optimal-stopping rule paradigm Haurin (1988) establishes an inverse volatility-liquidity relationship in his model: atypical houses, whose value volatility is greater than that of more standard houses, tend to stay on the market longer. In the last part of our paper we extend our analysis to study a variant of Haurin's (1988) model in an attempt to provide some "robustness check" on the main findings of this classic work. Several modifications are made to the original model including the relative role played by the buyer and the seller in the bargaining game and an alternative way to model risk and volatility. Our findings from the modified model corroborate those of Haurin (1988) , namely, in a setting characterized by private value and information asymmetry, the liquidity of the property is negatively correlated with the volatility of the property value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and derives the results for the benchmark cases of symmetric information. The cases of asymmetric information are considered in Sections 3 and 4 where the main findings of the paper are derived. Section 5 revisits Haurin's (1988) problem, and Section 6 concludes.
The Real Estate Trading Game
We consider a real estate market in which the buyers and sellers may possess symmetric or asymmetric information about the market-level, fundamental value of the real estate property for sale. The real estate market goes through hot and cold periods during which property prices can fluctuate substantially. The fluctuations, in general, are not caused by changes in the buyers' taste for the property, as taste is idiosyncratic and unlikely to vary much over time. Rather, property prices fluctuate mainly because market fundamentals change, as the asset pricing approach to real estate valuation suggests (Krainer, 2001) . Moreover, prior to trading a real estate property, the information available to the buyer and the seller may well be different concerning the market fundamentals that will prevail in the future. To the extent that real estate is both a consumption good and an investment good (Henderson and Ioannides, 1987) , and given that the real estate consumers' preferences and tastes do not experience much change over time, it is the change in the fundamental value of the property that is more likely responsible for the constant price fluctuation in the buyer and a seller meet in the first period and decide to trade a housing unit at price p , the second-period payoffs of the buyer and the seller are given by
and
If the two parties decide not to trade, then their second-period payoffs are instead . This has the implication that trading the housing unit is always the efficient outcome.
As in Krainer (2001) the trading process is modeled as an ultimatum bargaining game in which the seller, based on all information (public and private) available to him, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the potential buyer. If the buyer decides to buy the property at the seller's offer price, the two parties obtain their respective 3 As argued by Yavas and Yang (1995) agents may value a property differently and thus have motivation for trade because they may have "different liquidity needs, different preferences, or different plans for future," among other reasons (page 350). Our specification explicitly introduces a common-value component in the property value in order to capture the notion that certain attributes of a house (e.g., those related to its investment value) are typically valued the same by all agents, while still allowing for differences in their valuation of other attributes (e.g., those related to the house's consumption value). The existence of gains from trade (i.e. Yavas and Yang (1995) , as is common in most trading models of the real estate market. payoffs in the second period as specified above. Otherwise, the seller searches for another buyer and the process starts anew. Following Haurin (1988) , we assume the buyers' arrival rate is constant: exactly one potential buyer arrives to visit the seller's property per unit of time. One period in our model comprises a fixed number, N , of time units, during which the seller must either sell the property or exit the market. 4 In other words, the seller has a maximum marketing horizon of fixed duration. During the marketing period the seller incurs a cost of holding the property. Let ) (T g be the total holding cost over the marketing period T . We assume
This implies that the total cost of holding the property is strictly increasing with the time elapsed.
Our real estate trading model features both symmetric and asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller concerning the fundamental value of the house. We consider, in turn, different information structures and their implications for the relationship between market volatility and real estate liquidity. Specifically, we study four different information pairs: (a) informed buyer and informed seller, (b) uninformed buyer and uninformed seller, (c) informed buyer and uninformed seller, and (d) uninformed buyer and informed seller. In each of these cases, the informed party knows the house's fundamental value exactly, while the uninformed party only has knowledge about the distribution of this variable, which for simplicity is assumed to be the uniform distribution over a finite interval:
[ ]
The information structure itself is common knowledge.
5 Note that the dispersion of the uninformed party's assessment of the future fundamental value of the house is a consequence of volatile market conditions, and reflects the inherent uncertainty the uninformed party faces when making trading decisions. Thus k is a natural candidate as the measure of market volatility, which we adopt in the subsequent analysis. To ensure interior solutions and avoid the trivial cases where the probability of trade is always one, we also assume
In this section we start with an analysis of the benchmark cases of symmetric information. We investigate the role of information structures (a) and (b) in determining the relationship between market volatility and its liquidity. First, consider the case where both the buyer and the seller are informed about the fundamental value of the house. When facing a price p offered by the seller, the buyer's problem is to decide whether or not to buy the house at the offer price. Since she knows the fundamental value of the house and hence knows the level of payoff she can obtain if she buys the house at the offer price, and since she can always obtain a payoff of at . Knowing this, the seller who is also informed about the fundamental value, will offer a price
The buyer will accept the seller's price offer and the property is traded with probability one in the seller's first marketing attempt. In this equilibrium, efficiency is achieved with the seller extracting all the surplus (equal to d ) by virtue of his first-mover advantage.
Next consider the case where neither the buyer nor the seller are informed about the property's fundamental value f . By assumption both parties' common prior on
. In this situation the seller maximizes his expected payoff, taking into account the buyer's acceptance strategy. Because the buyer is risk neutral she accepts the seller's offer if and only if [ ]
. The equilibrium thus has the seller offering a price
. At this price the property is traded with probability one in the seller's first marketing attempt. As in the previous case the equilibrium achieves ex ante efficiency, with the seller again extracting the entire surplus.
In both of the above cases, market volatility (measured by the dispersion parameter k ) does not affect the probability of trade between the buyer and the seller.
A neutrality result for these benchmark cases is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the buyer and the seller are symmetrically informed about a
property's fundamental value, in the ultimatum bargaining game between the two traders, market volatility has no effect on the probability of trade and hence no effect on the property's liquidity. In equilibrium, the buyer and the seller trade the property with probability one in the seller's first selling attempt.
In this section we turn to the case of an informed buyer trading with an uninformed seller, and examine the relationship between market volatility and asset liquidity under such an information structure. The buyer has private information about the fundamental value of the house for sale but the seller's information set is one of public information, i.e., his ex ante assessment of the property's fundamental value is the commonly known uniform distribution [ ]
We characterize the seller's search behavior in such an environment. When the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to a potential buyer, there are two possible outcomes: either the offer is accepted or it is rejected. Both are the outcomes of the buyer's optimizing behavior given her private information about the fundamental value. Although too low a price will certainly be accepted by the buyer and result in a quick sale, the seller typically does not want to sell the house too quickly at the cost of a lower sale price. On the other hand, if his first offer price is set too high and rejected by a potential buyer, the seller will have to wait another unit of time and incur the corresponding holding cost before he has the chance to offer his house to a new buyer.
There exists a trade-off between a prolonged marketing period and the resulting high holding cost, and fetching a high price on the property. In such circumstances the seller's optimal search strategy is one of experimenting with a sequence of prices offered sequentially to a set of potential buyers. Lazear (1986) 
Substituting (5) and (6) 
The seller's problem is to choose 1 p to maximize his expected payoff, which yields the following first-order condition:
The solution to this equation gives the seller's optimal choice of offer price:
. We can then compute the corresponding probability of trade 
Because the seller incurs a cost of holding the property, his net expected payoff from this one-unit-time marketing period is
Next, consider the case of a two-unit-time marketing period, i.e., the planned marketing duration is two units of time during which the seller can make another price offer 2 p to a second buyer if his first price offer 1 p was rejected by the first buyer.
When the latter happens the seller realizes that his first offer price 1 p was set too high, and he rationally adjusts his second offer price 2 p downward based on his updated estimate of the property's fundamental value. The possibility of offering his property to a second seller if the first selling attempt was unsuccessful allows a richer strategy set for the seller. Learning of the common fundamental value component occurs over the marketing period and serves as a basis for the offer price change.
With two offer prices 1 p and 2 p the seller's problem becomes one of maximizing the following expected payoff: 
Substituting (12) and (13) into the expression for 
whose solution gives the seller's optimal offer price sequence:
. Thus the probability of trade 
Again, due to the holding cost the seller's net expected payoff in this case is
Using a similar line of reasoning and calculations, we can obtain the corresponding results for the three-unit-time marketing period as follows.
Optimal sequence of offer prices:
k p + = * µ 1 , d k p − + = * µ 2 , d k p 2 3 − + = * µ
Probability of trade:
Seller's net expected payoff: 
; the probability of trade from this marketing period is clearly a decreasing function of k, the measure of market volatility described earlier.
We thus obtain the main result of this section, summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose the buyer is informed about the fundamental value of the property for sale and the seller is not. The seller's optimal search strategy yields a probability of trade that is decreasing with the market volatility. Consequently the liquidity of the property is negatively related to the market volatility, ceteris paribus.

Price Signaling with Seller-Sided Private Information
Having examined the case of an informed buyer trading with an uninformed seller and its implications for the volatility-liquidity relationship, we now turn to the case of an uninformed buyer trading with an informed seller. In the real estate market or any market in general, it is not clear, a priori, which side of the market will possess better information on a decision relevant variable than the other, if asymmetric information exists in the market at all. In this section we examine a setting in which the seller who privately learns the fundamental value of his property offers it to an We thus analyze a signaling game in which the seller signals his private information through his price offer, to which the buyer responds strategically given her updated information about the property's fundamental value. We will characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this signaling game. A strategy for the seller is a choice of offer price that is contingent on the property's fundamental value privately observed by him, that is, the seller's strategy is a (measurable) function that maps the set of all possible fundamental values, [ ]
, to the set of permissible offer prices. The buyer's strategy is an acceptance rule determining which offer prices to accept and which ones to reject, when facing price offers from the seller. A PBE of this game consists of a pair of strategies, one each for the buyer and the seller, and a set of beliefs for the buyer concerning the true fundamental value f upon seeing the seller's price offers. Given the seller's strategy and her own beliefs about f , the buyer's strategy must maximize her expected payoff. Similarly, given the buyer's strategy the seller's strategy must maximize his expected payoff. A final requirement of the PBE -the consistency condition -is that the buyer's beliefs be derived from the seller's equilibrium strategy whenever possible.
In signaling games like this with a continuum of types, typically there exist a plethora of equilibria which renders a meaningful comparative static analysis nearly impossible. The difficulty stems from the fact that, without further restrictions, the buyer's acceptance set (i.e., the set of seller's offer prices deemed acceptable by the buyer) can be quite arbitrary; for example, the buyer may choose to accept the seller's offer prices 1 p and 3 p while rejecting offer price 2 p where 3 2 1 p p p < < -rather anomalous and counterintuitive behavior on the part of the buyer. To narrow down the set of possible PBEs we restrict the buyer's acceptance set to be of a reservation price type. More precisely, if the buyer accepts the seller's offer price p then she should also accept any offer price below p; the least upper bound of the set of all acceptable offer prices thus forms the buyer's reservation price. This is a more realistic scenario because, in practice, we do often observe real estate traders adopting such a trading strategy: accepting all offers below (or above) a threshold and rejecting those above (or below).
Let the buyer's reservation price be denoted by r which we will subsequently treat as a parameter in the construction of the PBEs. Knowing the form of the buyer's acceptance set, if the seller ever wants the buyer to accept his offer price in equilibrium, he will be better off setting his offer price equal to the buyer's reservation price (and not below it). On the other hand, if the seller's equilibrium strategy calls for the buyer's rejection of his offer price for a certain range of the property's fundamental value, then the seller can set his offer price to equal d k + + µ which will always be rejected by the buyer. Consequently we can, without loss of generality, 6 assume that the seller chooses from two potential offer prices: r or In order to derive meaningful comparative static results we will restrict our attention to the PBE which maximizes the seller's expected payoff. Clearly, this PBE is the one with d k r 2 + − = µ . 7 Also clear is the fact that this PBE maximizes the probability of trade as well, with the maximum probability of trade given by
because the seller will set his offer price equal to The following proposition summarizes the findings of this section.
7 More precisely, the seller's payoff from this PBE first-order stochastically dominates those from other PBEs.
Proposition 3. Suppose the seller is informed about the fundamental value of the property for sale and the buyer is not. In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
of the signaling game that maximizes the seller's expected payoff (which happens to also maximize the probability of trade) , the probability of trade is decreasing with the market volatility. Consequently, the liquidity of the property is negatively related to the market volatility, ceteris paribus.
There are two potential justifications for the choice of the particular PBE as the likely outcome of the signaling game. 8 First, as shown in Section 2 for the case of symmetric information, the seller, by virtue of his first-mover advantage, may have the ability to effect an outcome of the bargaining game that accrues to him all of the benefits from trade. A similar case can be made in the current situation of asymmetric information: His "market power" augmented with an informational advantage over his counter-party enables the seller to choose an equilibrium that is most advantageous to him. Another justification draws on the work of Yavas (1995) , who shows that real estate brokers can play a welfare improving and equilibrium selecting role by coordinating the activities of the buyer and seller and reducing the number of equilibria in the market. Note that the particular PBE selected in our signaling game (i.e., the one with
) achieves (constrained) social efficiency because it maximizes the probability of trade and thus maximizes the total expected surplus among all PBEs. 9 The second justification, therefore, is to allow an implicit role for 8 The general and more difficult problem of equilibrium refinement is beyond the scope of the current paper. . However, this PBE does not achieve the first-best efficiency which would require trade occur for all
, and hence is a second-best (or constrained) efficient outcome given asymmetric information. brokers in our model who may then serve to bring the trading parties onto an equilibrium that maximizes the social surplus. To the extent that real estate brokers are compensated chiefly on successful deals, it is clearly in their interest to improve the probability of trade between the buyer and the seller they serve.
The seller-offer, ultimatum bargaining game considered here and in Krainer (2001) is certainly not the only approach to modeling the bargaining behavior in the real estate market.
10 Several authors have considered alternative bargaining procedures and the associated information structures. For example, Yavas (1992) and Yavas and Yang (1995) study a "reduced-form" bargaining game where the outcome is determined by the players' relative bargaining powers and is related to the solutions of Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982) . In both papers there is no private information at the bargaining stage. Arnold (1999) describes an alternating-offer bargaining game in which both the buyer and the seller incur a cost of delay in the form of discounted returns. He characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game under the assumption of complete information. As acknowledged by Yavas (1992) and Arnold (1999) , modeling the bargaining behavior under incomplete information for the real estate market might be both more realistic and challenging especially in view of the existence of multiple equilibria. The model and equilibrium selection presented in this section may be viewed as a first step toward a more complete understanding of an issue that has practical relevance for the modeling of real estate transactions.
Haurin's (1988) Problem Revisited: The Case of Private Value
The primary setting of the current paper is one of common value, that is, there is a common-value component in both the buyer's and the seller's valuation of the property for sale, albeit unknown to one or both of the parties at the time of trading.
By contrast, many papers in the existing literature have considered settings of private value in the context of marketing real estate. One of the most prominent among them is Haurin's (1988) seminal work on the relationship between a property's marketing time and its degree of atypicality. 11 He argues that houses with greater atypicality tend to attract offers with greater variance. Because a profit-maximizing seller will wish to increase the property's marketing exposure in such circumstances in an attempt to fetch a higher selling price, atypical houses sit on the market longer than standard houses, which translates into lower liquidity for atypical houses. The author thus hypothesizes an inverse relationship between a house's atypicality and its liquidity, which is then borne out theoretically and empirically in the paper.
Note that the atypicality of a house in Haurin's (1988) model refers to those of the house's characteristics that are typically unobservable by the seller and idiosyncratic to the potential buyers; for example, the aesthetics of the house which by nature are buyer-specific. Importantly, the seller's own valuation of his house is independent of the value of the house's idiosyncratic characteristics to the potential buyers. The fact that a particular buyer places an extremely high or extremely low value on those characteristics, for example, does not in any way alter the house's value to the seller himself. In this sense, the setting in Haurin's (1988) paper is one of private value.
Because the idiosyncratic value of the house is known only to the buyer herself, the setting is also one of asymmetric information. Note also that the atypicality of a house in Haurin's (1988) In this section we extend the main theme of the current paper, i.e. the examination of the volatility-liquidity relationship, to the case of private value. We revisit Haurin's (1988) problem by studying a variation on his original model. Our purpose is to provide a "robustness check" on the main findings of this celebrated work using an alternative model specification.
In Haurin's (1988) original model, the seller, in the face of uncertainty about the potential buyers' offer prices, conducts a sequential search in which he trades off the potential benefit from waiting for another (better) offer against the cost of waiting, in the form of an optimal stopping rule. The seller's role is one of waiting passively for the potential buyers' price offers, whose probability distribution is known to the seller.
In our variant of the model, we consider a one-shot ultimatum bargaining game where an uninformed seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to an informed buyer, similar to the one studied in Section 4. (Meyer and Ormiston, 1989) . Under this approach, for the particular cases of uniform and normal distributions, one distribution is considered more risky or more volatile than another if the two distributions have the same mean but the former has a larger variance. Indeed, this is the most familiar and widely used concept of risk and volatility in the profession. In our modified model we employ another approach, the transformation approach (Meyer and Ormiston, 1989) , to model the volatility of the property value, as detailed below.
To make comparisons on the volatility of the house's idiosyncratic value d, under the transformation approach, d is assumed to be indexed by a scalar 0 Proof. See the Appendix. 13 Since we interpret d as the value to the potential buyers of the house's idiosyncratic characteristics, it is independent across the potential buyers as in Haurin (1988) . Thus, for example, if the seller does not sell his house to the first buyer, he learns nothing from this fact about the value of the house's idiosyncratic characteristics to a second buyer; his posterior distribution of d remains the same as the prior distribution. Hence it suffices to consider a one-shot stage game in our investigation of the volatility-liquidity relationship, for the same reason as in Section 4.
As stated earlier our main purpose in this section is to provide some theoretical corroboration for the main findings of Haurin (1988) in the framework of the current paper. To this end, two major modifications are made to the specification of the original model. The first concerns the relative role played by the traders. In Haurin's (1988) paper the potential buyers make all the price offers to the seller based on their idiosyncratic valuation of the house's "atypical" characteristics. In our model, by contrast and in line with the framework of the current paper, the seller is assumed to make the price offer in an ultimate bargaining game, with the knowledge that he is facing a heterogeneous pool of potential buyers.
The second modification has to do with the way volatility is modeled. The theory of risk tells us that the most general concept of a change in risk/volatility is that of second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) or, equivalently, mean-preserving spread (MPS) (Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 2005) . The changes in volatility defined both in the CDF approach and the transformation approach can be shown to be special cases of those defined in the more general SSD/MPS approach, using the single-crossing property of SSD/MPS (Wolfstetter, 1999) . The advantage of using the more restrictive volatility concept in the CDF or transformation approach is that it allows for comparative static results to be derived in cases where the SSD/MPS approach fails (Meyer and Ormiston, 1989) . Thus, by casting Haurin's (1988) original model under the new light of an alternative volatility concept and reproducing essentially the same result (i.e., the negative volatility-liquidity relationship), our analysis in this section lends support to the validity of Haurin's (1988) main findings.
Conclusion
The issue of what determines the real estate liquidity is a topic of perennial interest to the real estate researchers. We provide the first formal analysis on how market volatility affects liquidity in the real estate market. The investigation is carried out in a setting characterized by both common and private value as well as asymmetric information, and different information structures are examined in the context of a seller-offer, ultimatum bargaining game. Under symmetric information, i.e., when the buyer and the seller are either both informed or both uninformed, we find that changes in the market volatility have no effect on its liquidity. Under asymmetric information, in contrast, there exists a negative relationship between the market volatility and its liquidity. These findings can potentially explain phenomena that occurred during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis when the volume of property transactions were significantly reduced in the real estate market as investors became increasingly uncertain about the future market trend.
We contribute to the literature by studying how the market volatility (the second moment) affects real estate liquidity. Our work complements that of Krainer (2001) who identifies a level effect of the market-wide value component (the first moment) on market liquidity. While Krainer (2001) obtains a positive state-liquidity relationship in his paper, we demonstrate a negative volatility-liquidity relationship for the cases of asymmetric information. As an extension and by-product of our analysis, we also reaffirm the main findings of Haurin's (1988) classic work under an alternative model setting.
As in Krainer (2001) , we adopt the probability of sale as a liquidity measure throughout our analysis, which is less frequently used in the literature than the alternative measure of time-on-market (TOM). To the extent that transaction volume in a given time period is a more direct and measurable indicator of the market conditions, the probability of sale, arguably more readily linked to the transaction volume than TOM, might serve as a measure of the real estate liquidity no less desirable than TOM. Indeed, the two alternatives can be shown to be equivalent under stable market conditions. 14 The question arises as to which constitutes the better measure of market liquidity when the stability in market conditions cannot be assumed (Anglin, 2006; Johnson, Benefield and Wiley, 2007) . To our knowledge this question has not yet been addressed in the literature. We leave an exploration of this theoretical issue for future research.
14 Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2005) and Deng, Gabriel, Nishimura and Zheng (2012) assume the equivalence between the two alternative measures. Thus, the seller's problem is to choose 1 p to maximize the following expected payoff, given the optimality of the search after the rejection of the first offer:
